The hearing will come to order. I beg your pardon.

Thank you for being here. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. And welcome,

to our outside witnesses, as well: Susan Rice, a former Assistant

Secretary of State for Africa, now at Brookings; Stephen

Morrison, one of the leading think-tank experts on Africa, from

CSIS; and Larry Rossin, the leader of the Save Darfur Coalition.

Folks, it’s been 4 years now since the crisis in Darfur erupted,

4 years since the genocide began. And it’s been 3 years and 9

months since Congress formally recognized this as genocide. The

resolution in both the House and Senate passed, 3 years and 9

months ago, and it passed unanimously. Not a single member denied

the horror that was underway. It’s been 3 years and 7 months

since the administration added its own recognition. On September

9, 2004, in testimony before the committee, then-Secretary of State

Colin Powell said clearly that the killings in Darfur were genocide;

shortly thereafter, so did President Bush.

So, now, all these years later, the question still remains: What

are we going to do about it? What are we going to do to stop the

slaughter, to return the survivors to their homes, to bring those responsible

for the murder, rape, and terror to justice, and to build

a lasting peace? What are we going to do about Darfur? That’s the

question I’ve asked the Ambassador. And he’s the administration’s

point person for Darfur. And, like his predecessor, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, I have no doubt about his dedication and determination

to do the right thing.

In December, the Ambassador told a group of Senators that

Khartoum had until the end of the month to agree to the deployment

of U.N. peacekeepers. That deadline has long since passed,

with no agreement by Khartoum to accept the peacekeepers, and

no reaction, from the United States or the international community,

to its refusal.

Today, this committee expects to hear from the Ambassador a

concrete plan of action. I hope that he’ll flesh out the administration’s

plan B, as was referred to earlier, and tell us how and when

the administration will act on that plan.

What should we do about Darfur? Well, that’s the question I’ve

asked our outside witnesses, because there are almost certainly

steps the administration is not planning to take that this committee

should consider from these outside witnesses.

I have my own strongly held view on what we should do. Most

importantly, we need a comprehensive approach to what is a complex

problem. We have to work all six sides of what John

Prendergast, one of the leading experts on Darfur, rightly calls

‘‘The Policy Rubik’s Cube.’’ That will require the kind of resources,

coordination, and sustained engagement at the highest levels that,

in my view, we have not yet seen or we have not—not only from

this administration, but also we have not seen from our partners

around the world.

Let me quickly suggest some of the pieces of the complex approach

that need to be taken.

First, pursuing Khartoum is necessary, but not sufficient. We

need to work on the major rebel groups, as well. Three years ago,

after visiting a refugee camp on the Chad-Darfur border, I met

with the leaders of two of the major rebel groups. I urged them to

come up with a common program. I offered to host them in Congress

if they did. I warned them that if they did not, Khartoum

would use their division as an excuse to do nothing. We need a

major sustained diplomatic initiative to bring these rebels together.

Second, peacekeepers are essential, but they’re not enough. We

need a peace process. If we end the violence, but fail to achieve a

sustained political settlement in Darfur, the violence will return.

That puts a premium on a single peace process, supported by the

international community, including the African Union and the

United Nations, and managed by an oversight group of concerned

countries.

Third, unilateral sanctions may be necessary, but will not suffice.

We need a coordinated action from many other countries. The

United States has had significant sanctions on Khartoum since

1990. We’re almost sanctioned out, to use a phrase the President

used in another context.

For pressure to be meaningful, it must be multilateral. The Chinese,

the Arab world, the Europeans, the African Union, everyone

should be joining together in this campaign. Without American

leadership, I see absolutely no prospect of that happening.

Fourth, limiting our focus to Darfur is too narrow. We have to

include the neighbors, especially Chad and the Central African

Republic. I saw firsthand the spillover effects of Darfur—of the

Darfur crisis on Chad, and it has gotten much worse over the past

3 years. The crisis is putting an incredible strain on the neighbors.

And, at the same time, they have tremendous influence with some

of the key players. Our Darfur diplomacy and initiatives must include

the neighbors.

Finally, and most urgently, convincing Khartoum to accept a

meaningful peacekeeping force should be our goal, but if it refuses,

imposing such a force must be our mission. I wish that the African

Union had the mandate, the manpower, and the material to do the

job, but it does not. We must set a hard deadline now on Khartoum

to accept the hybrid African Union-United Nations force, and we

must start planning to impose that force if Khartoum refuses, and

to take other concrete steps that can start saving lives now.

I’ve long advocated a NATO-led no-fly zone to stop the air support

Khartoum provides to the Janjaweed. Recently, Khartoum

stepped up its slaughter from the skies. It is within our power to

clip their wings. Yes; a no-fly zone could make it more difficult for

humanitarian groups to operate, so we should do everything possible

to design it with their concerns in mind. And I expect to ask

the witnesses about that.

I hope that we could come out of this morning with a clear plan

for action. For too long, all of us have expressed our outrage at the

destruction of Darfur, without doing anything meaningful to stop

it. I think it’s long past time we must act, even if that action is

in the face of the refusal of Khartoum to accommodate anything.

I realize that sounds reminiscent of what I said 12 years ago about

Bosnia, but I think this is incredible. Our grandkids are going to

be seeing their own version of Hotel Rwanda that may look even

worse.

So, I thank you very much. I also want to point out that Senator

Lugar will be here, but he is testifying before the Armed Services

Committee on Nunn-Lugar, and he’s introducing a judge, before the

Judiciary Committee, from Indiana. But he will be here.

I thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador. And I indicated to the Senator

from New Hampshire, if he had an opening comment on the

Republican side, he’s welcome to it.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I now understand why you have not begun to implement plan B.

But what are some of the specific coercive steps in plan B?

Give us some sense of what the impact of sanctioning

these 29 companies would have on the overall economy.

What impact would that have on the oil trade

that the Sudanese engage in, for example, with the Chinese?

The Secretary General has asked you to hold off,

but do you support a new Darfur Security Council resolution?

My question——

What is the administration’s assessment of the

utility, the efficacy, of imposing a no-fly zone?

Thank you.

I must say, Mr. Ambassador, it sounds like the administration is

changing its position. And I thought you said to me that the most

useful sanctions available to us were unilateral sanctions that we

could impose that weren’t available to us in the 1990s, that we’re

now using in Iraq—I mean, excuse me, in Iran, and that——

And in North Korea. And so, I’m

confused. What are these—what are these multilateral sanctions

that are going to be so consequential that you’re worried, if we

acted on our own, we would lose?

I got that.

But in the meantime, a lot of people are going

to die.

I—Senator. Sorry.

Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, this hearing, to me, sounds eerily like a hearing

that took place 14 years ago about Bosnia. And the temporizing,

the number of times you’ve pointed out how the—which is

no doubt, it occurs—that the rebels are engaging in atrocities

themselves. I heard that for 3 years, the last year of the Bush administration

and the first 2 years of the Clinton administration.

And yet, there is—and the question I asked then, and I’m going to

ask you now: Is the—are the atrocities that are being carried out

sanctioned by, cooperated with, or a blind eye being turned by

Khartoum, not significantly greater than the atrocities that are occurring

at the hands of the rebels?

Well, I wish you’d stop talking about it——

Well, I’m——

Look, I’m——

No, no; it’s not politically sensitive. I mean, we

went through this exercise a couple of years ago, in coaxing out of

the administration the word ‘‘genocide.’’ Why won’t you just say? Is

‘‘genocide’’ still the operative word?

It is. So, genocide is being——

Committed in Darfur.

All right. All right, now——

Well, it seems to me that the need for an agreement

between the rebels and the government gets trumped by the

attitude of Khartoum, that has virtually nothing to do with the

rebels, by Khartoum’s supporting and engaging in a systematic

effort to engage in genocide. Notwithstanding the fact you may not

be able to get an agreement between the rebels and the government,

there are things we could do now that could significantly——

Reduce the number of casualties

that are occasioned by the Janjaweed receiving support from Khartoum.

They are distinguishable. And I am at a loss as to why we

aren’t engaging in everything, including the use of military force,

to stop it. I met with the NATO commanders in Europe. I then

spent time with the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, prior

to General Jones leaving. I was told that we had the physical capability

of essentially shutting down the Janjaweed now, that it

would take somewhere around 2,500 troops, that if we were to

argue strenuously, within the confines of NATO, for such a force

and the imposition of a no-fly zone, we could radically change the

situation on the ground. That does not get you a settlement, but

it does have the ancillary benefit of stopping thousands upon thousands

of people of being slaughtered and/or left to be slaughtered.

So, I find the desire to have a comprehensive settlement—or, it

kind of reminds me, if I can use a terrible metaphor—it’s kind of

like someone is on the table, bleeding to death, and they have incurable

cancer, and the doctors stand there and say, ‘‘Now, unless

we can come up with a holistic approach to this and figure out how

to not only stop the bleeding, but cure this patient of cancer, we

should hang on and wait until we get an overall plan here.’’

People are bleeding to death now. There are—the camps that I

visited, you could see it. When I walked into the camp in Chad on

the Darfur border of the northernmost camp at the time, I stunned,

I later learned—I didn’t realize I stunned anybody—but I stunned

the U.N. personnel there by insisting I meet with only the women.

And the men did not like that at all. And I insisted that happen.

And once I got a group of, I don’t know how many, women in one

of the tents, it took a while, but then they started talking about

what was happening to them. It’s happening as we speak right

now. Nothing has fundamentally changed.

And so, you know, it’s kind of like—the analogy I’d make is, the

patient’s bleeding on the table, and we talk about making sure that

everything’s going to be OK, not just—let’s stop the bleeding. Let’s

stop the bleeding, or do everything in our power to stop the bleeding

unilaterally.

And I must tell you—well, I won’t tell you. I think it’s a moral

imperative to do that. But I got the same arguments. You know,

it’s interesting, when we acted—finally acted in Bosnia, and we finally

acted in Kosovo, we did it unilaterally first. Everybody talks

about how this is—well, that’s a bunch of malarkey. It was finally

unilaterally we did it. We acted responsibly and morally, and the

rest of the civilized world had to respond. I would argue the same

thing would happen here. I think we could embarrass our European

allies into acting more responsibly. And I think it’s not only

time not to take force off the table, I think it’s time to put force

on the table and use it, and use it now.

But—and I acknowledge, that will not solve the situation, but it

will mean there will be 10, 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 15,000

women who will not be raped, children who will not die, and people

who will not be just murdered, just indiscriminately.

But you don’t need to hear that—I think you do need to hear

that from me, but I don’t expect that it will have much impact. But

I just want to be clear. I think it is genocide, we can act now, and

we should act now. If the President were asking me, if I were Secretary

of State, I would use American force now. But that’s me.

Anyone have anything they’d like to say before—or would you?

I’d invite you, if you want to make any—I don’t expect you to make

a closing comment, but you’re welcome to, if you’d like.

Remember the arguments—if I—don’t mind me

interrupting—I remember sitting with Lord Owen, saying, ‘‘You

know, we can’t use force, because—guess what? We may jeopardize

the British forces on the ground. We may jeopardize those forces

on the ground.’’ We were talking about jeopardizing military force

by using force. And now, we’re using an adjunct to that. It is true,

the use of force will jeopardize the NGOs on the ground. But the

NGOs are already jeopardized. They’re in tough shape right now.

And I’m anxious to hear the other witnesses, but I don’t get as—

I won’t say ‘‘rosy,’’ that wouldn’t be fair—as optimistic a picture of

what’s happening on the ground today, and the last month, and

hopefully the next month, as you seem to think exists. But—you

have more access to information than I do, but it’s not my impression.

But, anyway, go—I’m sorry to interrupt you, but——

You know how we got Dayton? We got Dayton

because we used force.

That’s why we got Dayton. This malarkey of—

this whole notion about how we’re rewriting history—we got Dayton

because we used force and we killed bad guys. That’s what we

did. And we got Kosovo because we were prepared and made it

clear to Milosevic we were ready to kill him. That’s how we got it.

I’m not big on killing people, but, I tell you what, this is incredible,

what’s happening. And I promise you—I promise you, we’re all

going to sit here, 5 and 10 years from now, and we’re going to be

saying, ‘‘Why didn’t we do the things that we can do?’’ There’s risk

involved, but the risk is relatively low compared to the absolute

devastation that’s taking place, and continuing to.

Anyway, I apologize. I just think we’re temporizing everything

much too much.

I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Morrison, can you recall whether any of our allies thought

that what Slobodan Milosevic was doing was genocide? I don’t recall

any of them thinking it was genocide. Matter of fact, I was in,

I think, every capital in Europe, and I was told by each of them,

particularly the British, that this was a civil war, it wasn’t genocide.

Am I missing something here? I mean, can you think of any

time where Europe has declared genocide in play recently? Any nation.

Pick one for me.

No; it’s not anything. I’m asking a simple question.

It’s a simple question. You made the point——

Sure you are. You know whether or not——

You’re a very bright guy——

You’re very well informed. Can you

recall any government, during the late eighties, early nineties, in

Europe, saying what Slobodan Milosevic was engaged in was genocide?

Name me one. Now, you were around as long as I am. This

is your full-time day job. You know, I mean, you know, you do it

all day. Can you think of a—the point I’m making is that you point

out that there is not a consensus that there’s genocide going on in

Darfur, among our allies and others, as if that carries any weight,

other than whether or not we’ll get their cooperation. You offer it

as it might go to the facts as whether or not genocide has occurred.

I’m just giving you the last recent example of genocide. I remember,

for 3 years, if not being the lone voice, one of the lone voices

out there saying genocide is being conducted by a guy named

Slobodan Milosevic out of Belgrade, and I remember being lectured

by the British, the French, the Germans, everyone, ‘‘No, it was not

genocide,’’ including many here in this country.

And so, I guess all I’m saying is, the fact that our friends don’t

recognize what’s going on is genocide doesn’t lend any credibility or

weight, to me, that there is or is not genocide. I just wondered if

you had heard anybody reference genocide.

And I would respectfully suggest one of the reasons why our European

friends and others don’t want to recognize this as genocide

is that it is a trump card. Once a nation engages in genocide—a

government—there is an implicit understanding that they have forfeited

their sovereignty. There’s no legal understanding of that.

There should be, in my view. But there is no legal understanding

of that, under international law. But that changes the whole

dynamic.

The reason why guys like me have been pushing for 4 years to

say this is genocide is to create that exact atmosphere, to make it

impossible for people to argue—not impossible—difficult for them

to argue that somehow Khartoum has legitimacy. I believe they

have no legitimacy. I believe they have forfeited their sovereignty

because of their concerted engagement in a policy of genocide.

That’s just me.

So, I just—I find the argument that none others say this is genocide—

I don’t remember anybody else in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992,

1993, 1994, saying genocide existed in the Balkans, in Bosnia.

That’s the only point I want to make.

I used to have a friend——

Please.

I’d invite——

Your comment.

Well, I’m not asking for support. I think the only

way you’re going to get support is act. The only way we got support

in the Balkans is, we acted, we shamed the French Government

into acting. Their public thought, in overwhelming numbers, it was

genocide. The French Government said it was not. I remember, my

detailed discussion with the President and then-Secretary of State

in the Oval Office, and asking, ‘‘Well, if we act, who will follow?’’;

said, ‘‘They will follow, because they cannot fail to follow.’’ Do you

think that anybody in the European populations think what’s not

going on is genocide, notwithstanding what their governments

think?

So, I guess what I’m saying to you is, we come at this from a

different perspective. I agree with Mr. Rossin, when he said that

he—I don’t know his exact quote—he said that diplomacy without

stiff sanctions to back it up has—is not likely to work. I don’t know

that he ever—I don’t know that he used the phrase ‘‘never work,’’

but is not likely to work. And so, I approach this from a completely

different perspective than you. I respect your point of view. You’re

a very learned fellow. But I just think that if you start off with the

proposition that Khartoum has no interest in a political settlement—

it has no interest—what is their interest in a political settlement?—

and then you would argue, ‘‘Well, if they have an interest

in the political—they have no interest, then you have to

sanction them.’’ Well, what sanctions are going to be sufficient

enough for them to conclude that changing a fundamental policy is

in their interest?

And you point out: We lack moral standing. I agree. This administration

has squandered our ability to be able to lead the world in

a positive direction. But if we lack moral standing in the use of

force, we clearly lack it in diplomacy. I mean, if we lack it one

place, we lack it both places. Matter of fact, the only place we’re—

at any rate, I apologize for—I just—we just start off with a fundamentally

different premise, and I think in 5 years there’ll be

another 500,000 or million people dead, maybe more.

And I would say, to Susan—excuse me—I would say to the Honorable—

that, you know, it is true, there weren’t that many who

had died in Kosovo, but 300,000 had already died in the Balkans—

300,000. So, I don’t want to—you know, I happen to agree with you

about Darfur. But I think these comparisons—I’d—we acted, in

Bosnia, under much less—much less consequence to the people.

There was a gigantic consequence in our failure to act. It ended up

with 300,000 women and children being dead. And when we

acted—when we acted, finally, thank God, in Kosovo, there were

295,000 women and children in the mountains waiting for the winter

to come, about to be starved to death. And so, I think they’re—

in that sense, they’re comparable. What is not comparable is Presidential

leadership, in my view.

But my time is up. I’m 33 seconds beyond it. I don’t want to, in

anyway, curtail any response to what I had to say, but let me yield

to my friend, and then invite any response you’d have to anything

I said.

I have one question, if I may. Ambassador

Rossin, you talked about the mechanisms that need to be set up

even to implement plan B. Do you have any indication as to how

far down the road the administration is in equipping the administration

to actually implement plan B, if it were signed by the President

tomorrow?

And I know there’s no way you can answer with

any great specificity, but if, tomorrow, the President turned to you

and said, ‘‘Set these mechanisms up,’’ how long would it take?

Dr. Morrison, leaving military option off the

table, and a more aggressively diplomacy, do you agree with the

Ambassador, in terms of the lack of a mechanism in place to aggressively

engage in diplomacy with the potential use of economic

sanctions?

No; with reference to us. With reference to the

United States, not only acting on its own, but seeking multilateral

support for the actions that are contemplated in plan B. In other

words, how prepared are they, if it—if, tomorrow, the President

turned to Ambassador Natsios, and says, ‘‘Go. I’m signing the

order,’’ how prepared for this vigorous diplomacy that you very

skillfully argue for—how prepared are we to implement it?

From the standpoint of EU members, what incentive—

other than a moral incentive, what incentive is there to

engage in, and participate in, multilateral sanctions? Is there any

economic or political or military or strategy interest that major EU

countries think is at stake for them if the situation in Sudan continues,

and Darfur continues, as it has the last 4 years?

And what are those?

What are some of those implications downstream

in other settings for European countries?

Yeah, but there’s a lot at stake there.

I mean, there’s the——

Possibility of a nuclearized Korean

Peninsula, a nuclear Japan, and a response from China. What

similar kinds——

Yeah.

I understand. Yeah. That’s a valid point.

Yes, Susan.

Last question. Susan, the point made by Senator

Lugar is self-evidently valid, that this is pretty complicated. And,

to use his phrase, it warrants walking around the problem a little

longer. You’ve walked around it for a while. If, in fact—is there

any—do you have any reason to believe that if, in fact, we move

through the three phases you’re talking about before we get to unilateral

use of force, or even multilateral use of force, is there any

reason to believe that in the circumstance of the use of force—targeted,

as you point out—that there would be the ability of any significant

portion of the 13,000 aid workers to be able to continue to

function in that region, or do you—or do you take it as a given

that, for all intents and purposes, unless the military action generated

a response from Khartoum that was favorable, in terms of

changing their position, that it would be a price that would have

to be paid? How do you calculate it?

Targeted military strikes.

Well, I thank you. I thank you all. This is—all

three of you have made a significant contribution to our deliberation,

and I appreciate it very much. I think we’re going to be asking

your assistance again. I doubt whether this is going to go away.